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1. Introduction  
 
Regional infrastructure can be seen as a platform to support exchange of inputs or final goods 
and services in an expanded economic area. The regional public goods perspective to regional 
infrastructure provision has characterized many challenges that normally have to do with 
coordination failures related to the construction and governance of large projects that usually 
have multidimensional externalities.1 However, active private sector participation in many 
integration projects show that contractual arrangements and provisions, under the umbrella of 
good legal and regulatory frameworks, can cope with those difficulties. Absence of or 
insufficient supply of infrastructure projects has not been a problem in the recent experience, 
among others, of southern cone natural gas integration. At the same time, the exchange 
supported by infrastructure comes in long term contracting format, particularly in energy 
sectors such as natural gas where proven reserves need to guarantee that sunk investment in 
pipelines will be recovered through appropriate use of capacity and that sunk elements of 
reserves development need also be recovered. Besides, domestic market conditions and the 
prevalence of domestic supply reliability objectives can in principle make exchanges 
contingent on domestic imbalances, that in turn can be due to shocks or to policy failures, such 
as inconsistent pricing or energy planning decisions. Foreseeing, perfect or imperfectly, such 
problems amount to precautionary decisions by exchange participants, that can be included in 
contractual formats. On the other hand, unforeseen contingencies or the inability of agents to 
incorporate them in written contracts, make contracts intrinsically incomplete. Therefore, there 
is an interdependency between private contracting of energy exchanges, energy planning (in 
the form of a balanced domestic market) and infrastructure provision, that critically makes 
infrastructure integration workable or not. 
 
The significant infrastructure integration of natural gas that emerged in the 90s in the southern 
cone on Latin America fits well into this problem. The evidence of the leading role played by 
the private sector has been used to argue that in energy sectors, so called infrastructure-related-
regional-public-goods can be easily supplied in a decentralized fashion with rather low public 
intervention, mainly in the form of “minimally” compatible rules across countries. Indeed, 
around the mid 90s about ten large to medium scale projects were put in place to transport 
natural gas in significant amounts, relative to domestic markets. Long term contracts of natural 
gas supply were part of this framework with embedded provisions for a reasonable exchange 
environment. Among these, gas producers in Argentina and electricity generators or 
distribution companies in Chile signed contracts under the umbrella of a trade protocol by both 
countries.   
 
However, in 2004 an imbalance in Argentina led to a restraint of exports, within a generalized 
shortage of gas deliveries, and to a claim and concern by Chilean authorities. At the private 
sector level, some litigation processes were triggered, particularly by those Chilean buyers 
(particularly electricity generators) that took the brunt of the cuts, against upstream gas 
producers on the Argentine side. The demand rested on the basis that the “major force” 
provision contemplated in the contract (as argued by Argentine gas suppliers) should not apply 
in the case, despite the indication that the Argentine market was under severe policy 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, Ruffin (2004). 
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intervention, given that the Argentine regulators did not directly intervene in gas contracts and 
rather allowed gas exports whenever a provision of equivalent energy (in fuel oil) were 
delivered to end users (mainly electricity generators). In any case, deliveries were seriously 
reduced and the foreseen scenario gave rise to pessimism on the strategy of integrated 
infrastructure to deal with long term reliable provision of energy.   
 
This paper looks at the intersection between energy infrastructure integration and contractual 
perspectives. It argues that in many cases imbalances in domestic markets related to shocks or 
to policy decisions make incomplete contracting of the exchange (to be supported by the 
infrastructure) the center stage of problem. This in turn implies the need for contract design to 
govern relationships among private participants and, at the policy level, some form of supra-
national coordination of decisions that affect exchanges, including energy planning.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the conceptual framework provided 
by applied contract theory to natural gas trade and inquires into sources of incompleteness in 
international exchanges. The discussion points to some dimensions that justify the quest for 
empirical evidence used in the paper. Section 3 describes central features of natural gas 
infrastructure integration in the Southern Cone, evidence on recent underperformance related 
to the Argentine energy imbalance and the policy decisions that followed since then. Section 4 
looks at the likely reasons for the generalized restrictions of supply to Chile as a form to 
discern between competing explanations of broken exchanges that are essential to understand 
the likely source of contract incompleteness and to qualify contending views in recent 
litigations. Section 5 moves to the scant but interesting evidence of contractual conflict and 
adaptation between private sector participants. Section 6 discuss lessons for contractual design 
and regional cooperation that are particularly relevant in view of recent major developments 
on natural gas infrastructure integration between Argentina and Bolivia. Finally Section 7 
draws the main conclusions.   
 
2. Contract Theory Perspectives in Natural Gas Trade 
 
Natural gas contracts usually come in long-term format depending on many dimensions at 
play. Early literature in applied contract theory stressed, among various dimensions affecting 
contract design, the sunkness of decisions chiefly related to pipeline infrastructure investments 
and the development of gas fields. The characterization provided came within the framework 
of transaction cost economics and complete contracting. A complete contract is a long term 
contractual relationship where related parties in a transaction (buyer-seller) make provisions to 
cope with opportunistic ex-post behavior from each other in face of idiosyncratic investments 
from each side.    
 
Long-term formatting predetermines the level (or sequence) of quantities and prices involved 
in a time trajectory and includes several contractual provisions to avoid opportunistic behavior 
against sunk investments. Chiefly among them is the minimum bill or take-or-pay or delivery-
or-pay provisions, identify in early literature applied to natural gas contracts (see Marsten, 
1988). “Pay” in those provisions does not necessarily involve cash payments but rather the 
obligation to take or deliver what it was written in the contract and in the case of gas deliveries 
may simply imply the requirement to find at the seller expense the quantities of natural gas 
required in the contract. 
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Studies that focused on natural gas were also interested not only in what determines observed 
contractual provisions, but also on how they change with the economic (regulation and 
competition) environment (e.g. Marsten and Crocker, 1985; Crocker and Marsten, 1988). 
Dimensions such as contract length were shown to (negatively) depend on the degree of 
competition in natural gas trade, with evidence coming from American markets given the 
relevance of the issues and the availability of data for large number transactions.    
 
More recently research spread across the Atlantic as European markets developed and allowed 
for data size to inquire on contractual response to liberalization. Recent econometric evidence 
on natural gas imports finds contract duration related to the competition regime, asset (project) 
specificity and volumes (Neumann and Hirshhausen, 2006). Further explanations of the choice 
of contractual length along these lines have been explained by structural elements such as the 
“perceived” elasticity of demand in the long run, where suppliers take advantage to lock-in 
exchanges (Neuhoff and Hirschhausen, 2005).   
 
The interesting feature of these results is that they are taken from international or cross-border 
transactions in an integrated (by infrastructure) market and thus are more rich and relevant for 
our setting. However, beyond the econometric evidence on general contract characteristics 
there are no details on actual contractual performance, conflict or adaptation and the absence 
of case studies is due to the difficulties of getting access to explicit contractual formats made 
available for research.    
 
Given this shortcomings it is understandable that issues of incomplete contracting, and in more 
general terms contractual governance of unforeseen contingencies, are not addressed by the 
received literature. To begin with, it is not at all clear why contracts should be intrinsically 
incomplete in the setting studied by previous papers, and what verifiable features make them 
incomplete. Perhaps a key feature in cross-border exchanges is the commitment of national 
governments not to intervene in dimensions agreed-on previously at a coordinated supra-
national level. These are precisely features that may have low relevance in the European 
integration experience. Nevertheless, exchanges in Europe do not come within the realm of the 
European Union and recent episodes of gas deliveries between Russia and neighbors cast 
doubts on the reliability of natural gas and led some governments to address questions of 
security of supply.        
 
A contract is incomplete if at the moment of writing there are contingencies that may affect 
the exchange later on and cannot be incorporated either because they are unforeseen or 
difficult to describe, observe or quantify.2 Unforeseen contingencies may be due to 
fundamental shocks in supply or demand structures or in policy variables that either affect 
them or hit at the exchange described in the contract. Answers to incompleteness in practice 
range from court “completion” in litigation procedures (which is, rather, third party 
“arbitration” and is subject to the same difficulties to discern phenomena that the original 
contractual parties faced) to “governance” frameworks agreed and incorporated into the 
contractual format. Contract theory in economics explores governance mechanisms while 
applied contract law studies focuses on court behavior.   
                                                 
2
 See Tirole (1994) and Salanie (1997) for technical surveys of theoretical issues and modeling strategies. 
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A simple framework to describe the potential sources of incompleteness in cross-border 
contracts of natural gas is provided with the help of the notation given by following identity, 
that expresses feasible exports for firm i (XiE) as a difference between production (XiS) and 
domestic demand (XiD).   
 
(1)                    )),(,()),(,( DeDDiSeSSiEi pIpXpIpXX θθ −≤  
 
Production XS depends on prices (p), current and past investment (denoted by IS) which in turn 
depends on expected prices (pe) and a state-contingent variable (θS) that represents supply 
(including geological) conditions. Domestic Demand depends on prices (p), current and past 
investment in natural gas-using equipment (ID, a function also of pe) and a state-contingent 
variable (θD) representing demand conditions (including growth and energy-use patterns). 
 
A contract is a sequence of volumes and prices (XiCE, pCE) that is individually feasible when 
written. That is to say that proven reserves of natural gas guarantee agreed volumes and also 
condition (1) across the time spam of the contract. Opportunistic behavior of a hold-up nature 
is controlled by specifying fixed quantities and prices (so these cannot be renegotiated or 
subject to ex-post bargaining). Moreover, if p,θS or θD, create an imbalance, such that (1) 
cannot be met, then suppliers o “sellers” in the contract have normally to “buy” enough 
quantities to sustain the agreed delivery at the given price (path) or compensate “buyers” in 
another form, depending on what was originally agreed. 
 
Aggregate consistency requires that adding up both sides of (1) also holds, even when it may 
not individually hold for some particular contracts. A stronger requirement for consistency is 
that individual contracts should satisfy (1) and, given other contracts, should also satisfy the 
adding-up condition. If aggregation of (1) across firms or contracts do not hold, then there will 
not be enough natural gas to satisfy exports and domestic markets at the same time, and 
individual contracts that cannot met (1) will not be able to cover the quantities required in the 
contract, by borrowing or buying natural gas from other producers. Aggregate consistency is 
normally supervised by the government, in the form of authorizations (conditional on 
observed balances and what is perceived in terms of risks), as a regulatory function to avoid 
the externalities created by individual decisions. In certain scenarios of abundant natural gas 
resources, the government –judging that there is no risk of aggregate imbalances- may follow 
an “authomatic” export authorization policy (AEAP), leaving to the private sector to evaluate 
the individual consistency of the project and granting permits once the private evaluation has 
passed.  
 
In this context, contract incompleteness are unforeseen contingencies given by realizations of 
the state-contingent variables θS and θD and by the price policy (p, pe), that cannot be 
anticipated at the time of writing the contract. Either (uncommitted) price policy decisions or 
shocks in supply and demand, or both, may violate aggregate consistency and render contracts 
incomplete insofar as there will be a generalized gas shortage, and contractual provision to 
back-up deliveries with borrowed gas will not be feasible.  
 
In this paper we distinguish between two competing hypothesis that have been commented 
elsewhere (Navajas, 2006) to address the natural gas shortage in Argentina and that are related 
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to the sources of incompleteness address before. The first hypothesis is that by the late 1990s 
and the early 2000s a shock in supply and demand conditions (θS, θD) not properly anticipated 
by producers or by government (i.e., in the context of an AEAP) led to individual and 
aggregate inconsistencies of export decisions, compounded by a slow response in investment 
decisions. The second hypothesis is that the price policy (p, pe) followed by the government 
created an aggregate imbalance, particularly on the demand side but probably also on supply 
investments, that render exports contracts unfeasible. We explore the evidence related to these 
hypothesis in section 4, after a reviewing the rise and fall of recent natural gas integration in 
the southern cone.       
 
3. Natural Gas Integration in the Southern Cone: From Success to Crisis 
 
Important discoveries of natural gas in the 70s along with a new paradigm of private sector 
participation and regulatory regime in the late 80s and early 90s raised business climate and 
prompted several exports projects to Chile, Brazil and Uruguay. At a supranational level, 
several protocols were signed under the ALADI framework and authorizations to built 
pipelines were granted. Table 1 summarizes the status of natural gas infrastructure integration 
in the southern cone.  
 
 
All projects except one were designed to transport gas from Argentina to neighbors, are 
relatively recent and became operative in the second half of the 1990s. Pipelines were built in 
this period with a capacity to deliver up to 42 MM m3 day, which represents a sizeable share 
(about a third) of the production capacity in Argentina. Albeit incomplete from data 
restrictions, Table 1 suggests important initial investment efforts, of about 2 billion dollars.    
 
The legal and regulatory framework for this exchanges is summarized in Table 2, describing a 
period of ten years from the Gas Law in Argentina to the starting of the domestic contractual 
Pipeline
Year Capacity      
MM m3 day
Distance       
Km
Current use   
(Jan-Aug 2006) 
MM m3 day
Initial Investment  
in millions USD
Initial Shareholders of Project
Chile
Norandino 1999 5 380 1.7 400  Tractebel and Southern Electric
GasAndes 1997 10 313 5.3 350
AES Gener (13%), Metrogas (13%), CGC (17,5%), Total 
Gasandes (10%), Total Gas and electricidad Chile S.A. 
(46,5%), 
Gasoducto del Pacífico 1999 3.5 530 0.6 342
TransCanada, 30%; YPF, 10%; Gasco, 20%; El Paso 
Energy, 21,8%; and Enap; 18,2%
Atacama 1999 8.5 531 1.5 380 CMS Energy and Endesa (50-50)
Metanex YPF 1999 2.0 8 2.0 6.5 na
Metanex SIP 1999 1.2 12 1.1 na na
Metanex PAE 1997 2 48,5 1.7 na na
Bolivia
Tarija-Campo Durán 1972 7.7 5 5.5 na na
Brazil
TGM 2000 2.8 450 0.9 250
Techint, CGC, TransCanada International, Petronas 
Argentina SA, CMS Gas Argentina, Repsol-YPF, 
Petrobras, Sulgas and AES.
Uruguay
Cruz del Sur 2002 6 200 0.2 170
ANCAP (20%), British Gas (40%), Pan American Energy 
(30%), Wintershall Energía S.A. (10%) 
Del Litoral 1998 0.7 15 0.1 na na
Source: From several private and public sources and internet sites
Natural Gas Pipelines in the Southern Cone
Table 1
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crisis in early 2002. Crucial to this framework were the bilateral protocols signed with Chile, 
the authorization mechanism for exports, the Mercosur Memorandum of Understanding on gas 
exchanges, the move towards an AAEP in 2001 and the measures taken immediately after the 
crisis in Argentina in 2002  pointing to objectives of priority of domestic supply. 
 
 
In this environment, exports of natural gas to Chile increased substantially from 1997 as the 
projects became mature.  Figure 1 shows a sharp increase from nil in 1997 to a peak of more 
than 20 MM m3 day, equivalent to about 17% of domestic demand, in 2004 and a drop since 
then. As contracted capacity was expanding and additional shipments were expected, the 
observed fall points to a deliverability problem explained below.    
 
 
 
Source: Official sources and Cafiero et.al. (2004)
•Competition Commission studies mergers and indirectly oversees state of exports supply 
•SE resolution (2001) makes authorizations automatic after a period without observations 
Framework for Natural Gas Exports: Pre-Crisis
Table 2
•Secretary of Energy (SE) resolution (1998) set exports permits mechanism, requiring proven 
reserves and ability/commitment to maintain supply to domestic market 
•After 2002 macro crises, domestic contracts frozen in pesos and export contracts not 
intervened (stay in US dollars). Again, requirements for domestic supply are stressed. 
•Bilateral Protocol (1995) sets norms that regulate supply and interconnection between 
Argentina and Chile. 
•Bilateral Protocol (2002) on information about “market conditions” and on “decisions” 
related to exchanges 
•Gas Law (1992) formally allows exports 
•Authorizations proceed on an individual and discretionary basis 
•Mercosur’ Memorandum of Understanding (1999) on gas exchanges. 
Figure 1
Average Daily Exports of Natural Gas to Chile
in MMm3day
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
Ju
n
-
97
Se
p-
97
D
ec
-9
7
M
a
r-
98
Ju
n
-
98
Se
p-
98
D
ec
-9
8
M
a
r-
99
Ju
n
-
99
Se
p-
99
D
ec
-9
9
M
a
r-
00
Ju
n
-
00
Se
p-
00
D
ec
-0
0
M
a
r-
01
Ju
n
-
01
Se
p-
01
D
ec
-0
1
M
a
r-
02
Ju
n
-
02
Se
p-
02
D
ec
-0
2
M
a
r-
03
Ju
n
-
03
Se
p-
03
D
ec
-0
3
M
a
r-
04
Ju
n
-
04
Se
p-
04
D
ec
-0
4
M
a
r-
05
Ju
n
-
05
Se
p-
05
D
ec
-0
5
M
a
r-
06
Ju
n
-
06
M
illo
ne
s 
de
 m
3 
/ d
ía
Total Chile Direct from producers
Total Chile through transport system
Gas Andes
 8
Export prices are reported in Figure 2, and represent average values from trade statistics in 
Argentina. One important feature of these prices is that they reflected the (quasi-strong) nature 
of integration between Argentina and Chile, since they were co-integrated with domestic 
prices.3 The reason behind this result is that export contract design made the sequence of 
export prices (normally indexed to reference fuels) constrained by the evolution of domestic 
prices. This feature shows that a one-price for both domestic and exports was at the heart of 
the integration design with Chile, very much unlike what it has been recently witnessed in the 
case of Bolivian exports of natural gas to Brazil and Argentina. Still, and despite this evidence 
of quasi-strong integration there were some regulatory problems concerning open access 
issues and pricing of transport as reported in Beato and Benavidez (2004). 
 
 
The post devaluation (2002) environment was relatively normal insofar as contracted 
deliveries, beyond certain yellow lights turned on in 2002 and referred to at the end of Table 2. 
The crisis erupted in April 2004, when after a log and hot summer with –strangely enough- 
shortages of natural gas, Argentina entered into a gas-constrained regime in domestic 
markets.4 In what was going to be the first moves in an unprecedented sequence of resolutions, 
                                                 
3
 This was so until the Argentine mega-devaluation in January 2002, were domestic prices were frozen in pesos 
and exports continued being denominated in dollar terms. Two vertical lines in Figure 2 indicate January 2002 
when the devaluation took place and March 2004, when the domestic crisis led to export constraints. The upward 
adjustment of export prices shown in the figure since 2004 may depend on contracts changes (addendum) given 
the argentine situation but it should also depend on indexation conditions given the link with fuels, and indirectly 
with the price of oil in international markets. Still, the raise in prices is less than what has been observed in other 
fuel-indexed export contracts in South-America, such as the Gas Sales Agreement between Bolivia and Brazil, 
and its level in mid 2006 is comparatively much lower, reflecting that prices (and its sequence) were favorably 
negotiated by Chilean buyers, which looked for prices similar to those observed in the domestic market. This 
situation changed dramatically in June 2006 as Argentina imposed a substantial export tax that was shifted to the 
Chilean buyers.  
4
 See Cont and Navajas (2004) for an early analysis of the episode.  
Figure 2
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the Secretary of Energy (SE) in Argentina first suspended the automatic exports authorizations 
(that is, reverted the “AAEP” adopted in 2001) and then moved openly to an invocation of the 
rule of priority to serve domestic markets.5 After an initial and temporary suspension of 
exports to “redirect” gas to domestic markets, the government then moved into perfecting the 
mechanisms through several resolutions by SE that stated that what it was sought was to 
require additional injections to serve domestic markets.6 Thus instructions were given to 
producers –amid accusations of negligence for not keeping investment efforts- for additional 
injections determined by SE on an individual basis. In this new framework, and given the 
burden imposed on Chilean demand –rapidly voiced at the highest level-, it was stressed that 
exports were not prohibited per-se “if” the required additional injections to domestic markets 
could be met directly with physical gas or with an equivalent fuel. 
 
The magnitude of the constraints that emerged from the mandatory supply to domestic 
markets resulted in “additions” that were equivalent in 2005 to about 37% (on average for all 
basins) of total exports measured in January 2004 (that is, in a month previous to the crisis that 
reflects  normal shipments). Table 3 shows these numbers for the three basins, where it can be 
seen that the “Neuqina” basin (the main source of exports to Chile) received the largest 
requests relative to exports.  
 
Basin
Daily 
average 
exports in 
Jan 2004    
MMm3d
Share in 
Exports
Required 
Additions to 
Domestic 
Market       
daily average 
2005 MMm3d
Share in 
required 
additions to 
Domestic 
Market
Additions in 
2005 / 
Exports in 
Jan 2004
  Neuqina 9.84 51.4% 5.32 74.6% 54%
  Austral 4.57 23.9% 1.21 16.9% 26%
 NorthWest 4.73 24.7% 0.61 8.5% 13%
  All Basins 19.14 7.14 37%
Source: Aggregate estimates from the Secretary of Energy
Memo item: Total Production in all basins= 141.3  in MMm3d for 2005; Neuquina had a 59% share.
Exports before the crisis and "required additions" to supply domestic markets in 2005             
at the different basins
Table 3
 
 
The previous Table suggest that producers in all basins suffered the same effect and that the 
picture is of a general shortage rather than a basin-located or individual producer one. In fact, 
this view is enlarged by the evidence shown in Figure 3, comparing the ratio of the actual 
exports to contracted export capacity in one of the main pipelines (Gas Andes, see Table 1 and 
Figure 1) with that observed for all pipelines. The Gas Andes pipeline, exporting from the 
                                                 
5
 Resolution SE 265/2004 of March 24, 2004 took this initial steps, including the suspension of Resolution 
133/2001 of automatic authorizations and in fact of export permits at all. Export permits were later on “restated” 
in Resolution SE 833/2005. All resolutions quoted are available from www.infoleg.gov.ar 
6
 The “genealogic tree” of resolutions here starts in Resolution SE 659/2004 to the more recent Resolution 
1886/2006. 
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Neuquina basin, is important for its size and location and, as it will be shown below, for being 
the center of one important contractual conflict that arose after the 2004 crisis.    
       
4. Competing Views of Broken Exchanges 
 
The previous section shows evidence pointing to a generalized shortage more akin to 
aggregate than individual inconsistency of export contracts. Thus it seems that aggregate 
explanations are in order and following the conceptual framework used in section 2 these 
explanations must be related to aggregate (non-price related) supply shocks, inconsistent 
domestic pricing policy or autonomous (non-price related) demand shocks. We submit two 
competing, albeit not mutually exclusive, explanations. The first one is related to evidence 
connected to a supply shock, while the second one has to do with domestic imbalances caused 
by distorted pricing. The role of autonomous demand shocks is seen within this second 
hypothesis (i.e. whether demand growth is due to price or non-price factors). Of course, both 
hypothesis involved unobservables and therefore are only partially addressed by the available 
evidence. This is true for the researcher but also for the courts, besides the fact that both 
explanations may be concurrently present in the evidence and it may become difficult to chose 
the dominant one. In fact this is a pervasive problem from the perspective of incomplete 
contracting, since otherwise third party arbitration could easily complete contracts ex-post. 
 
The first hypothesis is related to a shock that may have operated in the form of structural 
“fatigue” in supply, perhaps due to geological reasons and/or related also to required 
investment efforts, that was not properly anticipated by producers and the government alike.7 
This shock would render contracts incomplete if it was unforeseen early on or, alternatively, 
may lead to arguments of negligence of some producers concerning investment provision 
                                                 
7
 In the statements contained in Resolution SE 133/2001, the government argued that the level of reserves in 
Argentina and the recent discoveries in Bolivia created enough margin to proceed with automatic export permits 
(so called “AAEP” in the terminology of section 2).  
Figure 3
Ratio of Observed Exports to Contracted Capacity
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given that it could have been foreseen. An obvious problem with this hypothesis is that it 
depends on unobservable, or difficult to verify, assertions about supply conditions. 
Additionally, another conceptual difficulty is that in order to fit into observed results, of a 
generalized or coordinated failure or negligent behavior by producers (and the government).  
 
This hypothesis has, nevertheless, some foundation in conclusions and comments obtained 
from an early energy study on Argentina, performed by a World Bank mission in 1989 (see 
World Bank, 1990). One conclusion from that study is a sort of warning about the dynamics of 
supply efforts to sustain the evolution of domestic demand and to avoid reaching a critical 
Reserve/Production ratio (underlying and italics are mine).      
        
“The urgent need for an accelerated exploration and development program is clearly shown by the trend in the  
[Reserves/Production] R/P ratio. In 1987, the…R/P ratio in Argentina was 20 years, comfortably above the 
critical level of 15 years….…Even if a substantial exploration program is undertaken immediately, and all of the 
probable and possible reserves are actually discovered, the critical R/P ratio… [for Demand Management]… 
will be reached by the year 2002.” (op. cit. p.101) 
 
A second remark of the study was directly related to the export policy on natural gas and the 
risks for the reliability of supply for domestic users (underlying and italics are mine). 
 
   “In the case of all three projects exports now being considered…the buyer who must make a significant 
investment in pipelines (e.g. Chile) will insist on a long term supply contract and probably require that adequate 
reserves be explicitly dedicated to their project. None of the proposed export projects would impose a limit on 
near-term gas availability… but they would reduce availability over the long term…Discussions should be 
continued with potential buyers of Argentine gas; however, the national long term supply base should be 
assured before long-term export commitments are made.(op. cit. p.111)   
 
Concerning the first quotation, the actual evolution of production and proven reserves in 
Argentina coincides with pessimist expectations. As Shown in Figure 4, the 
Reserves/Production ratio reached 15 years in 20028, with reserves falling since 2001, 
suggesting that exploration results could not match the speed of production. Even though this 
does not mean an exact forecast by the study (given that many changes in Argentina happened 
in the 12 year period) it fits exactly as a qualitative comment that suggest that supply risks 
existed and had been mentioned before by authoritative sources.  In Navajas (2006) this 
argument is complemented by historical data (1970-2005) taken from the energy balances 
published by the Secretary of Energy (2006) which shows a very intensive pattern of natural 
gas use.  
 
Concerning investment efforts to sustain the R/P ratio above the critical level, given the 
dynamic demand pattern, there is also some evidence showing a sluggish exploration effort 
after 1999. This is shown in Figure 5 where the number of wellheads explored fell sharply 
compared to the previous decade. Nevertheless, the evidence shows that new wellheads for 
development or production did not suffer such a drop, suggesting that production efforts were 
still high and that the problem was rather related to exploration results. Reasons for the drop in 
1999 cannot be attributed to a deteriorated contractual environment, as it may be argued for 
2002 onwards. Low oil prices and a recession in Argentina might explain a wait-and-see 
                                                 
8
 The reasons for suggesting a ratio R/P of fifteen years are explained in the study, since the chosen figure 
depends on the characteristics of the Argentine up-stream sector including geological considerations. 
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policy that was later on compounded or reinforced by a contractual intervention and a freeze 
on prices.    
 
Source: Scheimberg (2006) 
Figure 5 
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Figure 4
Argentina: Natural Gas Reserves and R/P Ratio 
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The second hypothesis relates the observed imbalances with a policy-induced distortion in 
domestic markets after a freeze in domestic prices that, along with a rapid recovery, created a 
large increase in demand while depressed incentives to producers. The main evidence for this 
view is provided by the divorce between natural gas prices and benchmark substitute fuels, 
particularly in transport. This excess demand for direct use of natural gas was reinforced by a 
similar freeze in end-user prices of electricity, a large user of natural gas.9 Figure 6 shows the 
sequence of prices of natural gas for domestic users, the price of imports of natural gas from 
Bolivia10 and the price of fuel oil (as a benchmark substitute in thermal generation of 
electricity). In general liquid fuels such as gasolines (relevant for substitutions towards natural 
gas in transport)11 followed a pattern similar to the fuel-oil price described in Figure 6.   
 
 
 
That prices are divorced from opportunity costs does not mean that the actual shortages follow 
simply from this direct observation. Rather we need some measurement that first decomposes 
the imbalances in supply and demand factors and then proceeds to explore the role of prices. 
This exercise was performed in Cont and Navajas (2004) and an up-date to the first part of 
2006 in summarized in Figure 2.7.12 The right hand side bars of the panel show factors 
                                                 
9
 Prices for industrial users both in gas and electricity began to adjust in 2005 and 2006, while they still remain 
frozen for residential and small commercial user. Prices of GNC were also partially adjusted in 2006.  
10
 In the recent long term contract signed between Argentina and Bolivia the base price (chosen for the first 
quarter of 2007) is 5 dollars per MM BTU. 
11
 Gasification of the private transport fleet (mainly cars) in Argentina has been substantial since the early 1990s 
but it suddenly accelerated after 2002 in reaction to relative prices. According to national energy balances natural 
gas accounted in 2005 for almost 20% of the use of energy in transportation.   
12
 We developed a decomposition of the gas shortage from a computable identity that matches the natural gas 
required by electricity generators with the disposable natural gas. This two parts are expressed in equivalent 
natural gas units and result, respectively, from the excess demand for electricity (when hidro and nuclear 
generation is subtracted) and the excess supply of natural gas (when demand components different from 
Figure 6
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contributing to the shortage, while the left hand side are those compensating the shortage. In 
2004 when the shortage erupted (to an equivalent of 2.4 MM m3 per day, on average for the 
January-April period) the explaining factors were the fall in hydro-generation (due a long dry 
cycle), the increase in the demand for electricity and natural gas and to a lesser extent the 
growth in natural gas exports. On the other hand natural gas supply reacted positively (even 
though not rapid enough to meet demand). The situation changed in 2005 and 2006, were 
demand factors became more important in the explanation of the shortage. For instance the 
sharp increase in the demand for GNC between 2003 and 2006 was equivalent to 90% of the 
observed shortage.     
 
 
 
While the evidence shows that demand growth played a leading role in the imbalances, it has 
been said that this may be due to GDP growth or to an output-mix effect that, for instance in 
industrial demand, shifted output to energy (gas and electricity) intensive sectors after de 
devaluation in 2002. However some scrutiny of these arguments with available data suggest 
that their role is not fundamental. Income (growth) effects were netted out in Cont and 
Navajas (2004) using available income elasticities from econometric evidence and they do not 
represent a large effect given that the economy was in fact recovering previous output levels. 
Concerning the output-mix effect, Navajas (2006) performed simulations of observed shifts in 
aggregate and in industrial production since 2002 and used available input-output coefficients 
to approximate changes in energy intensity. The result was that this sort of changes were small 
                                                                                                                                                         
electricity are subtracted). International trade in natural gas and electricity is also included in both sides. This 
decomposition allows to explain the observed shortage of natural gas, in relation to a “normal” year (2003) in 
terms of several components, to test whether supply or demand (an of what type) are dominant explanations and 
to proceed to test the role of prices (versus growth or output mix changes that affect energy intensity) in the 
demand side.  
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and happened between 1998 and 2002, so they cannot be attributed to the observed policy 
changes.      
 
To sum up, addressing likely causes of observed shortages we find that rather casual evidence 
in favor of a supply shock, possibly not properly anticipated by producers and the government 
(leading to a less dynamic supply response to demand challenges) coexist with evidence of 
induced price distortions and demand factors. While the data suggest that demand factors are 
primarily responsible for the observed shortages, one cannot deny that a sluggish supply and 
low investment exploration efforts were underlying factors operating before the 2002 crisis.    
Observed shortages of natural gas are immediately explained by demand factors and point to a 
policy intervention effect. But the extrapolation of the observed reduction in the 
Reserves/Production ratio along with warnings expressed several years before suggests that 
sooner or latter the intervention was going to be effected. This contending evidence is what 
makes third party arbitration procedures precisely so difficult to implement. 
 
5. Contractual Conflict at the Gas Andes Pipeline 
 
Immediately after the restrictions on natural gas deliveries began to bite on the Chilean side, 
communications and negotiations started at the highest official level, with obvious claims 
from the Chilean side on the basis of protocols signed in 1995 and other further agreements. 
The response from and position of the Argentine government was made clear in several 
critical dimensions arguing that (i) there was an umbrella (protocols) but not an official 
commitment to exports, (ii) exports permits were wrongly decided by previous administration, 
(iii) legislation (and protocols) were clear concerning priority of domestic markets, (iv) 
decisions to supply exports were private decisions, possibly mistaken, (v) Observed natural 
gas shortages in general were explained by insufficient investment in upstream, (vi) exports 
are not prohibited if suppliers can deliver substitute fuels to domestic end-users. At the same 
time the Argentine government stated an unwritten commitment to maintain supplies 
whenever possible and to avoid cutting residential demand for urban areas such as Santiago. A 
new conflict emerged in mid 2006 when Argentina introduced an export tax within an 
operation to balance an increase in the price of its imports from Bolivia, with a substantial 
effect in final prices.   
 
The interruptions also triggered contractual conflict at a private level between buyers of 
natural gas in Chile that had participated in the pipeline projects and producers in Argentina. 
One important case is related with deliveries through the Gas Andes pipeline (see Chart 1) in a 
conflict that started early on in 2004. The importance of looking at this case is that it is 
relevant because is a major transaction (about 2.5 MM m3 day, representing 12% of total 
exports to Chile at the time of the interruptions) on the larger pipeline to Chile.13 
 
The contract involved in this conflict had originally being signed in 1996 by “Buyers” (two 
generators and a Distco) and “Sellers” (about five gas producers operating areas at the 
                                                 
13
 This is not the only case but it may be the largest one. Other conflicts emerged in transactions using the 
Gasoducto del Pacífico (see Table 1)  between trading companies (delivering gas to industrial users) in Chile and 
Repsol-YPF in the Neuquina basin, while similar demands were evaluated by electricity generators in the North 
of Chile, using the Noradino Pipeline, against producers in the Nothern basin. 
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Neuquina basin). The qualitative features of the contract are all expected arrangements from 
the perspective of contract theory surveyed in section 2. The contract (i) was a long-term one 
(17 years) in line with the nature of the exchange and the sunk investments involved; (ii) had 
fixed quantities (with enlargement provisions) from a gas field committed exclusively to this 
export activities; (iii) had prices indexed by fuels but constrained to domestic pricing at the 
basin; (iv) was a take-or-pay contract, with flexible clauses for Buyers that may reflect 
demand uncertainty and contemplated outside opportunities (for the “untaken” gas) to Sellers; 
(v) was a delivery-or-pay contract with no flexibility, reflecting perhaps very low uncertainty 
of supply; (vi) had a “Force Majeur” provision contemplating for instance a case of direct 
government intervention; (vii) had an arbitrage mechanism of disputes.       
    
These features provided a seemingly reasonable design of contractual base given the nature of 
the exchange, investment in both sides and the stage of development in (gas to gas) market 
competition. Rigid elements of this contract, compared to what has been depicted by the 
evidence in the US and Europe (Neumann and Hirschhausen, 2006), can be understood given 
structural elements. However, the contract had apparently a weak management of unforeseen 
contingencies, such as problems with overall gas availability. One critical element in contract 
design was that the inability to deliver gas was supposed to be covered with natural gas from 
other producers, rather by an alternative fuel (such as was the condition imposed by the 
Argentine government to allow exports). This is to say that the contract did not contemplated a 
massive bottleneck in gas deliverability from Argentina to Chile and therefore the ex-post 
resolution of impeded exchanges were treated as a commercial risk from Buyers or Sellers 
defaulting individually.  
 
In face of the events and the lack of response by Sellers to the request by Buyers of the  
contractually agreed deliveries, these initiated an arbitration demand on damages for the 
undelivered natural gas, within the terms of the contract. The process of litigation, under the 
umbrella of the ICC, is in process with resolution pending for 2007 and we obviously had no 
access to the material related with this legal procedure. 
 
But some comments on the strategies followed by the parties are in order, given what has been 
presented in this paper. Sellers argued a “Force Majeure” situation given the constraints 
imposed on them in Argentina. However, this position apparently resulted difficult to sustain 
in court. From the evidence commented before it results clear why this might have been so. 
First of all, exports were not explicitly prohibited and could in principle be allowed if an 
alternative substitute (fuel-oil) is delivered to the domestic market, even though this might 
have been a strategy by the Argentine government to shift the burden to producers, knowing 
before hand that the proposed mechanisms for export authorization would be non 
implementable for all cases.14 Nevertheless some evidence exists that the mechanism was used 
in specific and isolated cases or events.15 
                                                 
14
 Of course, for  suppliers the problem with this proposal was not the availability of alternative fuels but the 
uncertainty about the price to be recognized by the Secretary of Energy, given the difference in prices between 
natural gas and fuel oil (see Figure 6). Expected losses and legal implications over pending contracts went against 
participation. Beyond this lack of incentive, which resulted in negligible acceptance of the mechanism, there is 
the hypothetical but interesting case that the announced condition for an export permit (i.e. supply an alternative 
or equivalent amount of fuel-oil) while valid for a single transaction, may not feasible in the event that all 
exporters accept the offer, given the inability of the domestic users to for example run thermal units with such an 
 17
Second, and perhaps more problematic to Sellers, to invoke “Force Majeure” and avoid this 
being seen as an excuse for neglicence, Sellers need to show that they had no way to anticipate 
the imbalances that occurred in Argentina after 2002. However, against this position is the 
evidence commented in section 3 related to signals of “supply fatigue”, lack of exploration 
efforts before 2002 and the warnings written in the World Bank report of 1990, concerning the 
balance between gas availability vis avis dynamic demand. 
 
On the other hand, Buyers argued for plain or outright contractual negligence rather than 
“Force Majeure” or unforeseen contingencies. From this angle the argument was simply the 
lack of investment or provisions that should have been foreseen by Sellers to keep supply 
given the evolution of domestic demand in Argentina. In the end, this argument by Buyers 
resembles, or rather exactly matches, the official Argentine explanation of the imbalances and 
shortages.16 However, this line of argumentation has also several problems via a vis the 
evidence presented in this paper. First of all, the generalized, rather than individual, partial 
interruptions of deliveries (see Table 3 and Figure 3) goes against the view that this was an 
individual negligence case. In terms of the framework presented in section 2, it was not only 
individual but also aggregate consistency that was violated in the case, with evidence that 
shocks in supply, demand or price policy (θS, θD, p, pe) have been interacting. Given that 
“aggregate negligence” is a rather difficult argument, this may nevertheless motivate research 
behind aggregate inconsistency or perhaps coordinated tacit behavior among producers that 
could have led to a generalized shortage.17 But this an issue that goes beyond the narrow and 
focused bilateral case that will be addressed by the arbitration court. 
 
A second problem for the Buyers demand is the evidence of government intervention in post 
2002 and the imbalances created in the domestic market, particularly the role of demand vis a 
vis supply in explaining domestic market disequilibrium, that cast doubts on the simple and 
lineal argument of the Argentine government that it was due to lack of supply and investment 
efforts. Evidence for an exacerbated pattern of natural gas use at disequilibrium prices suggest 
                                                                                                                                                         
amount of fuel. To my knowledge no one has tested if an unanimous acceptance of the condition to export 
violates the maximum (reasonable) fuel constraint of the dispatch of thermal units in Argentina or imposes 
logistic costs (of fuel delivery) that are unreasonable .    
15
 Indeed this was used by the Buyers who participated once in the mechanism and complaint that this was a 
proof that the Sellers had used the “Force Majeure” argument to disentangle themselves from obligations on how 
to manage the problem, particularly given their position and knowledge of the Argentine market to organize such 
exchanges.   
16
 This may sound strange given the voice expressed by the Chilean authorities about the crisis, and the 
suggestion that it was necessarily connected with regulatory decisions taken after 2002. But this was what 
Chilean Buyers, or their lawyers, argued and need not be congruent with official arguments or explanations. For 
the Chilean authorities it became clear that the contracts were a private concern and that there could not be an 
official legal claim against Argentina. 
17
 For coordinated or tacit behavior of export decisions it is required that decisions taken by individual producers 
in the Argentine market be “strategic complements” (i.e. raise the marginal benefit of the same actions of others), 
in the expectation that domestic prices would accommodate to clear domestic markets. Given that  exports 
contracts were designed so as to adjust prices in line with domestic market prices, a rise in export prices is 
guaranteed establishing the link for actions (export decisions) to be strategic complements. This problem was to 
my knowledge never discussed in Argentina. The only intervention by competition authorities in relation to 
exports to Chile had to do with some proposed mergers or acquisitions of producers participating in the export 
projects, that led to an evaluation of the cases but not to problems of conduct such as those hypothesized above.    
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an excess demand scenario, with supply lagging behind after years of low investment efforts 
that were even more paralyzed by the price policy (p, pe) faced by all Sellers alike. 
 
The impression from this analysis is that it will be a hard job for the arbitration court to 
“complete” the contract and that, despite claims on the contrary by Buyers, the incomplete 
nature of the contract lies in the fact that it was not prepared to face events of the nature and 
magnitude of those experimented years after.  
 
6. Issues and Lessons for Contract Design and Regional Cooperation 
             
There are two areas of analysis and policy making where the topics discussed in this paper 
contribute directly or indirectly. One is the field of contract design for international exchanges 
of  energy that are supported by infrastructure investments. The second one belongs to issues 
of regional cooperation and coordination of policies among participant countries. 
 
Given the evidence that existing contracts did not include provisions that were targeted to the 
aggregate inconsistency of export decisions, there seems to exist room for improving design. 
Efforts in this direction should be concentrated at the study of contractual provisions related to 
the presence of aggregate energy imbalances on both sides, but particularly on suppliers. This 
is so because the later can take investment efforts, autonomous or in response to policy 
decisions that may jeopardize the sustainability of contracts. Ex ante clauses to govern 
contingencies are difficult to write down, but provisions can help at providing some back-up 
for these circumstances. The back-up provisions apparently present in existing contracts 
assume that the Seller can find alternative sources of supply and therefore  do not properly 
address a generalized shortage. Explicit inclusion of deliveries of substitute fuels (that is, the 
back up fuels that will be finally used by Buyers) could work better that assuming that natural 
gas will be available elsewhere. 
 
Rather than reflecting past experiences, these issues are relevant for very recent transactions 
between Argentina and Bolivia. In fact, the ENARSA-YPFB contract signed in 2006 between 
both firms is a big project to supply up to 27 MM m3 day from the southern Bolivian basin 
that involves, according to preliminary estimates, a major infrastructure investment in 
pipelines of about 1.2 billion US dollars and additional investments in Bolivia to develop the 
gas fields of about 2.0 billion. The contract has been made public in both countries and its 
design shares some of the features common to long-term minimum bill contracts.  
 
However, the contract is weak on the dimensions stressed in this paper and, in particular, the 
management of contingencies related to a generalized shortage of gas in Bolivia sometime in 
the future. Given the level of certified or proven reserves, optimism about deliverability is 
similar to the one stated at the moment of writing contracts between Argentina and Chile. The 
commitment of the Bolivian side is only contemplated in the take-or-pay provision, but a 
clause in the contract implies that, in face of interruptions, priority of supply will be granted to 
the domestic market, then followed by previous export contracts to Brazil. Even though the 
domestic market is small compared to export volumes, it has a large potential of development 
if policies promoting domestic industrialization are adopted. Thus the contract is subject to the 
same problems that were present in the Argentina-Chile integration surveyed in this paper. 
The fact that the contract was signed by both governments does not add much security of 
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supply given that it is a commercial contract between two public firms and there is no 
agreement or commitment at a government level and above the contract (beyond an agreement 
of intentions to cooperate in the project). Finally, the contract has also a feature that do not 
belong to good practices of regional infrastructure integration and its reading casts doubts on 
the willingness of Argentina to normalize export permits to Chile.18         
 
At the regional cooperation level the message of this paper is that there are reasons to enlarge 
the focus on regulation-cum-competition design for infrastructure projects (see for example 
Beato and Benavidez, 2004). More attention to conditions to sustain  exchanges on the 
infrastructure are required. Some of these conditions go back to good policy design to mitigate 
regulatory risks of sovereign decisions by governments, particularly if the view is that policy-
induced mistakes are responsible for impeded exchanges. The question of commitment 
mechanisms by participant governments (to domestic pricing policies for example) is a 
difficult one but it may deserve a coordinated effort.  
 
But some other conditions go beyond good regulatory design for infrastructure and to the 
realm of energy planning, particularly if the view is that mistakes in long term energy policy, 
for example in the form of  absence of monitoring of conditions of aggregate consistency of 
private decisions, are responsible for broken exchanges. A weak form of coordination between 
governments is to create a permanent exchange of information and monitoring. In the case 
studied in this paper, the governments of Argentina and Chile agreed on that mechanism in 
2002 (see Table 2),when the evidence suggests that the crisis was already well into the radar. 
Since this weak form of coordination may be seen as too little for the required corrections, it 
should be set well in advance to avoid being too late. The contract between ENARSA of 
Argentina and YPFB of Bolivia contemplates a monitoring mechanism of this sort.        
 
Hard forms of coordination of energy policies are more difficult to suggest and implement 
given the traditional reluctance of governments to commit what are viewed as strategic policy 
decisions including national security of supply. Nevertheless this case shows that critical 
assessment and risk evaluations of energy planning may render high benefits for energy 
infrastructure integration. Coordination here would imply simply a request that energy plans in 
an agreed format are made available and subject to stress tests. In the case described in this 
paper, Argentina abandoned energy planning (not to mention stress testing) in the belief that 
privatization with a good regulatory framework and efficient private participants would suffice 
for sustainable energy development. It did not, and the message written inside the World Bank 
mission report in 1990 was superseded by unfounded unlimited optimism.       
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper draws on applied contract theory and uses evidence on policies, markets and 
private transactions to discuss the experience of natural gas infrastructure integration in the 
                                                 
18
 Clause 3.3 of the contract states that the quantities delivered will be allocated to serve domestic markets in 
Argentina and “cannot be allocated to increase exports authorizations to third countries (being public and/or 
private companies) without the agreement of both parties”. The claim of Bolivia to Chile of a way out to 
overcome its insularity is a longstanding one. Beyond this fact, the policy of exports authorizations of Argentina 
will continue to be tied to required gas to be redirected to domestic markets or on the above mentioned 
mechanism of making alternative fuels disposable.  
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Southern Cone of Latin America. The argument is that contracts on international exchanges 
supported by infrastructure may become incomplete due to contingencies not anticipated at the 
moment of writing. Sources of contingencies may lie in supply and demand shocks or be 
related to policy-induce price distortions. Some or all of these sources may create imbalances 
in domestic markets of exporting countries, leading to aggregate inconsistencies. 
 
The Argentina-Chile integration experience fits well into this mold. At an aggregate level the 
evidence presented in this paper shows how policy decisions framed the integration of markets 
and later on reversed the integration path when shortages of a generalized nature began to 
emerge. We argued that an inquiry into the sources of the shortages is relevant for separating 
anticipated from unexpected shocks, supply from demand impulses, and policy-induced from 
market-participants-induced distortions. This separation is also essential to discern the degree 
of responsibility of Sellers and Buyers in private transactions, like the one referred to using the 
Gas Andes pipeline. The evidence falls short of being conclusive on the dominant or ultimate 
factor behind the broken exchanges, even though the quantitative evidence on market 
disequilibrium post 2002 seems more robust than casual evidence on lack of investments or 
supply fatigue. But this may reflect the state of available data and of used methods and is open 
to further inquiry. What seems clear and conclusive is that the event being studied is of an 
aggregate nature rather than an isolated break of an individual exchange relationship. Rather, 
the crucial distinction is whether this was due to policy-induced or agents-induced mistakes. In 
this respect, individual decisions by natural gas producers to move to massive contractual 
export arrangements and the possibility of tacit coordination given its effects on domestic 
market equilibrium is another avenue of research that deserves attention.          
 
Finally, this paper has clear lessons for both private agents and policy-makers alike. While 
regulatory risk mitigation solutions in both contracting and policy making have been stressed 
before, this papers adds specific points on back-up contract provisions designed to cope with 
aggregate imbalances, on ex-ante weak forms of supranational coordination related to 
information about market conditions and on energy planning dialogues that test consistency 
and stress situations in markets where exports originate. Methods and institutional 
mechanisms to perform this coordination seem to be another useful area of applied policy 
research. 
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